As the increasing of data exchange technology, the security in publishing views has been paid more attention to.
INTRODUCTION
With the development of database technology, data exchange frequency and quantity increase continually, the problem of information disclosure is outstanding day by day in the view publishing process, so guaranteeing security of published view becomes a new subject of database security.
As enterprises collect and maintain increasing amounts of personal data, individuals are exposed to greater risks of privacy breaches and identity theft. Many recent reports of personal data theft and misappropriation highlight these risks. As a result, many countries have enacted data protection laws requiring enterprises to account for the disclosure of personal data they manage [1] . Hence, modern information systems must be able to track who has disclosed sensitive data and the circumstances of disclosure.
Traditional security mechanisms protect data at the physical level. For example, firewalls and other perimeter mechanisms prevent the release of raw data, as do conventional access controls for file systems and databases.
In data exchange, however, such mechanisms are limited since they can only protect the data up to the first authorized recipient. When data is exchanged with multiple partners, information may be unintentionally disclosed, even when all physical protection mechanisms work as intended. As an extreme example, Sweeney proved this [2] when she retrieved the privileged medical data of William Weld, former governor of the state of Massachusetts, by linking information from two publicly available databases, each of which was considered secure in isolation.
The problem of auditing a log of past queries and updates by means of an audit query that represents the leaked data has been studied in [3] . However, given some sensitive data, it is often difficult to formulate a concise audit query with near-perfect recall and precision. Moreover, the tuples in the sensitive table may have undergone a certain amount of arbitrary perturbation. Finally, the number of suspicious queries produced can be very large, necessitating an ordering based on relevance for an auditor's investigation. In addition Rakesh Agrawal presented an auditing methodology that ranks potential disclosure sources according to their proximity to the leaked records. Given a sensitive table that contains the disclosed data, methodology prioritizes by relevance the past queries to the database that could have potentially been used to produce the sensitive table [4] .
Database watermarking [5] has also been proposed to track the disclosure of information. Database fingerprinting [6] can additionally identify the source of a leak by injecting different marks in different released copies of the data. Oracle [7] offers a "finegrained auditing" function where the administrator can specify that read queries should be logged if they access specified tables. However There does not appear to be any automated facility to determine which queries should be audited. This paper erects a probability model of security U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright deciding at the logical level. Then provide a new deciding theorem, it can measuring information disclosures.
II. THE MODEL OF SECURITY-DECIDING
We assume a standard relational schema consisting of several relation names R1, R2, . . ., each with a set of attribute names. Our research is based on the standard relational schema.
In Probabilistic database, a database instance is regarded as a real world. In the schema, a database instance is denoted by I, and the probabilistic of the database instance is P(I). Let define all database instance as is the database instance set which don't pass the K test, it's database instance probability is presented by P(I'); Therefore, we have a probability: 
III. THE THEOREM OF SECURITY-DECIDING
The theory of security deciding in publishing views is enlightened by "query-view security". The attacker knows prior knowledge K, the domain D, and the probabilistic of database instance P(I) and publishing view V. Attacker's aim is to infer the private information S by these factors. To realize the security deciding in publishing views, we introduce the concept of entropy. In the information system, information entropy is always used to judge the indefinity among variables.
If private query is denoted by Q, private information is S publishing view is V we can get private information entropy :
The union entropy of private information and publishing view:
A. The Decision of Absolute Secure View
The absolute secure view is that the attacker can't infer any information in private information S, even if he knows publishing view V and prior knowledge K. 
B. MEASURING DISCLOSURES
In chapter 3, we knew "M" means "tuples match to S and V" and "U" means "tuples do not match to S and V". 
. Assume that the M-label and U-label are themselves independently assigned to each pair, with probability p [0, 1] to assign an M-label and probability 1−p to assign a U-label. Then, the probability that some unlabeled pair s, v has a comparison vector γ equals: 
=1-U]
The value of matching computation of S and V is H sec2 ,
Our definition of leakage is the following:
Here, We call H sec1 security coefficient 1 and H sec2 security coefficient 2. The variable x and y are determined by expert.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Now we have done some experiments to prove the theory of security deciding in publishing views, and certify Analysis of the experiment: with the increase of variable's amount, the relevance of publishing view and private information will decrease. So the disclosure of information will also decrease. From table 5-1, we can see that with the increase of the size of publishing attribute, the leak will decline quickly. The reason is that attacker always infers the private information through publishing view, so when the size of N profession increases, the probalility that attacker can get a single tuple will decrease. But with the increase of N profession , H (V) will decrease. H sec1 and H sec2 will be close to zero. That is the value of leak will be close to zero, the insecurity of the publishing view will decrease. In the real world, when S is private information, we will still publish the data of profession attribute.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel definition of security for analyzing. The information disclosure of publishing views and shown several important results. We argue that it is indispensable for developing practical tools for monitoring information disclosure. We have already shown the theory of security deciding in publishing views (Theorem1 and Theorem2) .We provide a method of measure leakage. We believe these results may be a basis for logically security of publishing views in the future.
